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A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN AND DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN 
Rehabilitation or Liquidation: 
Consumers' Choices in Bankruptcy 
The purpose of this analysi~ is lo Identify the legal, en•ironmental, 
and ecouomk characteristics of debtors that are predicllve of their 
Bankruptcy Code choices. The probability that debtors file under thr 
rehabilitation procedure pro•ided br the Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 
13) is influenced by the availability of credit counseling as an alter-
native to bankruptcy and by the adverse effects of a liquidation 
bankruptcy (Chapter 7) on future ability to qualify for consumer and 
mortgage credit. More generous state laws protecting debtors' assets 
from liquidation in Chapter 7 have a negative effect on the probability 
that a debtor will contract to repay some debts out of future income in 
Chapter 13. The results also suggest that the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which 
restricted Chapter 13 plans providing zero repayment of unsecured 
debts, precipitated a decline lo the probability that nonbusiness 
debtors would choose the rehabilitation altemath·e. 
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to establish procedures by 
which debtors may resolve, in an orderly and equitable fashion, 
problems associated with insolvency or their inability to repay debts 
out of income. A major revision in the Bankruptcy Code enacted in 
1979 and subsequent amendments significantly changed administra-
tive procedures associated with chapters of the code pertaining to 
nonbusiness debtors. The purpose of this paper is to identify the 
legal, environmental, and economic factors that influence the relative 
benefits and costs of rehabilitation versus straight bankruptcy. A 
model of the determinants of nonbusiness debtors' choices is empi-
rically estimated based on the cross-state variation in the probability 
that debtors in bankruptcy filed petitions under Chapter 13 of the 
code. 
The change in the availability of Chapter 13 provided by the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 had a noticeable positive influence on the 
average probability that a petitioner would choose that route to debt 
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relief. But the changes in procedures for Chapter 13 provided by the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 had an 
offsetting negative effect on the general probability that a petitioner 
would choose Chapter 13. Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act was 
enacted, about 25 percent of nonbusiness petitions for bankruptcy 
were filed under Chapter 13. Between 1980 and 1983, the proportion 
of petitions filed under Chapter 13 climbed from 25 percent to 31 
percent. By 1988, the proportion had declined, and approximately 27 
percent of nonbusiness petitions were filed under Chapter 13. 
In addition to the above observation that the overall average pro-
portion of nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 13 
appears logically correlated with changes in the Federal bankruptcy 
law in the last ten years, considerable cross-state variation exists in 
the statistic. In the 12 month period ending June 1986, the propor-
tion of total nonbusiness petitions filed under Chapter 13 varied 
from 3 percent to 69 percent across the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. 
Recent studies have analyzed the causes, costs, benefits, and pro-
cesses of bankruptcy (American Bankruptcy Institute 1987; Johnson 
et al. 1982; Sullivan 1982) and the effects of changes in the law on 
overall trends in bankruptcy (Shephard l 984a; Shephard 1984b; 
Shiers and Williamson 1984; White 1987-1988). There has been some 
analysis of the economic circumstances of debtors who choose 
Chapter 7 versus those who choose Chapter 13 (Sullivan and Drecnik 
1984), and there is ongoing debate concerning the optimal bank-
ruptcy legislation. 
Interest in the determinants of debtors' choices in bankruptcy is 
based on the need to understand further the economic incentives 
associated with nonbusiness bankruptcy. There is evidence that un-
secured creditors recover a higher percentage of claims in a Chapter 
13 procedure relative to Chapter 7.' However, current law does not 
require debtors to choose that avenue to debt relief that produces the 
lowest loss for lenders and, therefore, the lowest social cost. 2 With 
'White ( 1987·1988) found that 29 percent of unsecured creditors recovered a nonzero 
amount from Chapter 13 cases compared with only 3 percent for Chapter 7 cases. The payoff 
rate was 6.1 percent of unsecured claims in Chapter 13 cases in contrast to 0.1 percent in 
Chapter 7 cases. 
'Sullivan and Drecnik ( 1984) found evidence of a significant degree of inefficiency relative to 
social cost with regard to petitioners' choices in bankruptcy. The social cost created by their 
bankruptcies had not been minimized in the cases of about 25 percent of nonbusiness petitions 
analyzed. 
greater knowledge of the multitude of factors that influence debtors' 
choices, policy makers will be in a better position to draft laws to 
produce the desired social outcome and to evaluate the social conse-
quences of the continuously evolving institution of bankruptcy. 
DEBTORS' CHOICES FOR DEBT RELIEF 
Debtors are assumed to repay debt according to the terms of their 
contracts as long as the net benefit associated with repayment exceeds 
that of default. The debtor seeking relief from existing credit con-
tracts has several possible courses of action. These include restructur-
ing debts, either privately with creditors or by enlisting the services of 
a credit counselor; petitioning for rehabilitation or liquidation under 
the Bankruptcy Code; or outright default. Outright default allows 
creditors to exercise various legal remedies provided by the contract 
for the express purpose of increasing debtors' costs or limiting 
lenders' costs associated with default. These remedies include wage 
garnishment, repossession of collateral, and late night phone calls. It 
is assumed that debtors seeking debt relief will choose the course of 
action that provides the highest personal net benefit (present value of 
benefits net of present value of costs). 
Debt Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code 
The act of petitioning for debt relief under the Bankruptcy Code 
provides the debtor with immediate and statutory relief from lenders' 
collection efforts, including the exercise of any creditors' remedies. 
Beyond that point, the procedures associated with the two chapters 
in the Bankruptcy Code that apply to nonbusiness debtors may pro-
duce dramatically different results in terms of the relative net benefits 
to the individual debtor. Therefore, an analysis of the factors 
associated with debtors' choices requires an understanding of the 
provisions of Chapter 13 (rehabilitation) and Chapter 7 (liquidation). 
Under Chapter 13, the debtor retains all assets and proposes a plan 
for the repayment of debts out of future income.' Prior to the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Chapter 13 was called the wage-earner 
'The repayment period is typically three years, but a five year repayment plan is possible 
With special permission from the court. 
plan and was not available to all nonbusiness debtors. Under current 
law, it is available to all nonbusiness debtors with total unsecured 
debts less than $100,000 and secured debts including mortgages of 
less than $350,000. 
The repayment plan need not be approved by creditors but must 
have court approval as a "good faith" effort to repay debts. To be 
deemed as such, the plan at the minimum must provide full payment 
of priority claims and pay unsecured creditors at least as much as 
they would receive under Chapter 7 from the proceeds of the liquida-
tion of nonexempt assets. All unsecured debts left unpaid by the plan 
are discharged. Payments specified by the repayment plan are 
directed to a trustee who in turn distributes them to creditors named 
in the plan. 
Under Chapter 7, which is technically a bankruptcy, all the peti-
tioner's nonexempt assets are forfeited. A trustee, acting on the 
authority of the court, liquidates the assets and distributes the pro-
ceeds, after extracting a fee for services rendered, on a prorata basis 
to unsecured creditors. All remaining unsecured debts not fraudu-
lently incurred or specifically excluded from discharge are then dis-
charged. 
Reflecting concern that debtors were not adequately informed 
about their options for debt relief provided by the code, the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 required that 
petitioners receive written notice from the bankruptcy clerk in-
dicating the chapters that were available. The petitioner must con-
firm that he or she was aware of the availability of all chapters in-
cluding Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and the debtor's attorney must at-
tach an affidavit to the petition stating that the debtor was informed 
that other chapters could be used, including Chapter 13. 
Factors Influencing the Debtor's Choice 
The expected net benefit of petitioning under one chapter versus 
the other is the product of the sociolegal environment in which the 
decision is made. The expected net benefit of debt relief under the 
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code can be represented by the follow-
ing: 
(1) the face value of unsecured debts legally discharged less the 
value of assets forfeited (for Chapter 7) or less the present value of 
payments required under a repayment plan approved by the court 
(for Chapter 13 ); in the case of Chapter 7, the above sum would be 
adjusted for the probability that the petition will be rejected if the 
judge found that it represented a substantial abuse of Chapter 7;• 
(2) plus the value of immediate cessation of creditors' collection 
activities (including legal judgments against income), less the 
decline in the present value of gains from future dealings with 
creditors; 5 
(3) less the direct financial costs of filing (including attorneys' fees 
and court costs); and 
(4) Jess the present value of any costs associated with loss of stature 
in the community, on the job, or at home.• 
Types of debts owed 
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code establish that Chapter 13 
may not be chosen over Chapter 7 to minimize the value of the 
recovery provided for unsecured creditors. However, the relative net 
benefits associated with the two chapters may differ for an individual 
debtor due to differences in the dischargeability of various types of 
debts and the treatment of secured debts. For example, student debts 
and debts acquired by fraud may be discharged under Chapter 13 but 
not under Chapter 7.' 
Further, under Chapter 13 a debtor with claims secured by an asset 
may keep the asset while repaying an amount equal to its current 
market value. For consumer loans, the market value of the security is 
generally well below the outstanding balance of the debt. Thus, the 
"cram-down" provision of Chapter 13 may be the source of a signifi-
cant reduction in secured debt obligations. In contrast, under 
Chapter 7 the asset securing the claim is forfeited unless the debt is 
reaffirmed, a procedure that may require the repayment of the full 
outstanding balance due. Therefore, the expected value of debts 
'Debtors' freedom to choose becween chapters was statutorily limited by the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. That law provided that petitions under 
Chapter 7 that represented a "substantial abuse" of its pro•isions could be denied by chc 
judge. (Public Law 89-353. Seccion 312,707) 
'Umbeck and Chatfield (1982) identify the only cosc of defaulting on a loan contract a< che 
present value of potential gains from fucure dealings with the creditor and ochers who have the 
information about the default. 
'Employment discrimination by private employers based on bankruptcy or a debt dis.charged 
or dischargeable in a bankrupccy case is prohibited. (Title 11 of the U.S. Code, Secuon 525) 
'Compare U.S. Code 1328(a)(l982) with U.S. Code 523(a)(l982). 
legally discharged in bankruptcy would not be the same under both 
chapters for those debtors who have student debts, debts obtained 
through fraud, or secured debts. 
Credit after bankruptcy 
Post-bankruptcy costs, primarily the effect of discharge on the 
debtor's ability to qualify for credit after bankruptcy, may also differ 
between the two chapters. The debtor who files under Chapter 13 is 
not considered bankrupt and credit reporting practices may favor 
debtors who choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7. The full repayment 
of debts under Chapter 13 may qualify the debtor to be considered 
for credit in the future just as a credit applicant who had never filed 
bankruptcy would be considered.' Further, the debtor who is granted 
a discharge under Chapter 13 may file for debt relief again under 
either chapter at any time. The debtor who has debts discharged 
under Chapter 7 may not file bankruptcy again for at least six years. 
In the summation of costs and benefits above, Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 are identical in terms of the first half of (2) but may differ 
markedly in terms of the cost component specified in that section. 
Holding other things constant, debtors with high future demand for 
credit would prefer Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. 
Legal environment 
State legislation specifies the value of personal assets exempted 
from creditors' claims in Chapter 7 and limits actions taken by 
creditors in the case of an outright default. These legal conditions in-
fluence the relative net benefits associated with petitioning under one 
of the two bankruptcy chapters and the relative benefit of bank-
ruptcy versus outright default. 
A.s:s-et exemptions. The dollar value of assets exempted from li-
quidation in Chapter 7 is determined by state law in 35 states and by 
Federal standard established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act in the 
other states. The state laws vary from the Federal standard and 
among each other. 
'Some creditors guarantee debtors that their creditwonhiness will not be affected by a peti-
tion for debt relief under Chapter 13 that provides for the repayment of 100 percent of 
unsecured claims. 
In Chapter 7, unsecured creditors' claims are paid out of the pro-
ceeds of the liquidation of the nonexempt assets. Thus, the lower the 
level of asset exemption, holding other things constant, the lower the 
net benefit associated with Chapter 7. The asset exemption allowance 
also has a direct effect on the net benefit of Chapter 13 in that the 
value of payments to unsecured creditors proposed under the repay-
ment plan may not be less than the liquidation value of nonexempt 
assets. This provision in Chapter 13 procedures forces the minimum 
economic transfer proposed under Chapter 13 to be equal to the max-
imum possible under Chapter 7. 
Petitioners with all assets exempted ("no asset" cases) may prefer 
Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 because they would not be able under cur-
rent law to win approval of a repayment plan that provided zero 
repayment unless the petitioner had zero disposable income. 
However, petitioners with nonexempt assets may prefer Chapter 13 
to Chapter 7. Consider that debtors' perceived value of nonexempt 
assets is likely to be higher than their liquidation value. Thus, the 
lower the value of assets exempted in Chapter 7, the higher the 
perceived cost of Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13. As the asset exemp-
tion allowance declines, the probability that the petitioner qualifies 
as a "no asset" case declines. Summarizing these two situations, it is 
hypothesized that the probability that a petitioner would file under 
Chapter 13 increases as the exemption allowance declines, holding 
other things constant. 
Wage garnishment. As stated previously, an alternative to bank-
ruptcy is outright default, an action that allows lenders then to exer-
cise legal remedies to limit default losses. One such remedy is the gar-
nishment of wages. All lenders operate under a Federal law restrict-
ing the extent to which debtors' wages are subject to garnishment. 
But in some states, garnishment of wages for purposes of repaying 
consumer debts is strictly prohibited or restricted to a greater extent 
than is provided by the Federal Iaw. 9 Holding other things constant, 
'The Federal standard for weekly wages exempt from garnishment is the greater of 75 per-
cent of the disposable earnings of the debtor or 30 times the minimum hourly wage in effect at 
the time the earnings are payable. This standard was effective as of July, 1970 under Title Ill of 
the Consumer Credit Protection Law. Exceptions include debt due for state or Federal tax and 
for alimony and child support. 
States that restrict garnishment more than the Federal standard may exempt 40 times the 
hourly minimum wage or 85 percent of disposable income. Some state laws provide the same 
general PfOtection as the Federal law but provide greater exemption (85 to 90 percent of earn-
ings) if the debtor is a head of a family. States that prohibit wage garnishment (protect 100 per-
the expected net benefit of outright default might exceed that for 
either chapter in bankruptcy for those debtors whose wages may not 
be garnished. As a result, debtors dealing with repayment problems 
in markets with garnishment prohibitions would be expected to ex-
hibit a lower probability of filing bankruptcy. 
As evidenced by a number of empirical studies (Apilado et al. 
1978; Sullivan and Worden 1988), the prohibition or more severe 
restriction of garnishment is associated with significantly lower rates 
of nonbusiness bankruptcy in cross-state analyses of the incidence of 
bankruptcy, holding other things constant. Thus, one may assume 
that the net benefit to debtors of bankruptcy under these conditions 
is lower than the net benefit of outright default. 
To protect themselves from the higher probability of outright 
default, lenders prohibited or more severely restricted from garnish-
ment action would provide less unsecured credit and/or require more 
collateral on secured debts. The substitution of secured debt for un-
secured debts would exhibit itself in bankruptcy petitions in that peti-
tioners ·with more secured debts are likely to file under Chapter 13, 
holding other things constant, as the "cram down" of secured debts 
to the market value of the collateral may reduce the amount the deb-
tor would have to repay relative to what could be required under a 
reaffirmation associated with a Chapter 7 discharge. Therefore, 
where garnishment is not readily available as a creditors' remedy, a 
higher probability of Chapter 13 filings is expected, holding other 
things constant. 
Credit counseling 
Debtors with repayment problems but who have disposable income 
may conclude that the renegotiation of the terms of their debt con-
tracts through the services of a credit counselor has a higher net 
benefit than petitioning under Chapter 13 where contracts would be 
renegotiated with court protection and supervision. Credit 
counselors represent debtors in negotiations with creditors to reduce 
periodic repayment obligations to the level of disposable income. 
Further, upon enlisting the aid of a credit counselor, all collection ac-
cent of earnings) may do so only for the payment of consumer credit or if "earnings are 
necessary for family suppon." 
tivities are halted. Therefore, the benefit of the "automatic stay" 
provided to petitioners for bankruptcy is also forthcoming for those 
debtors using credit counselors. 
The National Foundation for Consumer Credit represents a net-
work of local not-for-profit Consumer Credit Counseling Services 
(CCCS) that provide the bulk of available credit counseling services. 
The operation of a CCCS office is supported by contributions from 
lenders and from independent corporations and individuals. There 
were 340 CCCS offices in early 1988, up from 200 in 1980. Their pur-
pose is to "help those with serious money problems find relief 
through budget planning, money management, and planned debt li-
quidation.''' 0 
In some states there are no CCCS offices and in others the number 
of offices is very small relative to the size of the debt-using popula-
tion. The extent to which credit counseling is a viable alternative to 
bankruptcy or outright default is, therefore, not uniform across all 
credit markets. However, previous studies demonstrate that the inci-
dence of bankruptcy declines significantly as the availability of credit 
counseling services increases (Sullivan and Worden 1988). It is likely 
that credit counseling is an alternative to bankruptcy only for those 
debtors who have disposable income who might have filed under 
Chapter 13 to solve their repayment problems. Therefore, the proba-
bility of filing under Chapter 13 is hypothesized to decline as the 
availability of credit counseling services increases, holding other 
things constant. 
Demographic characteristics 
Demand for credit, types of debts owed, and ownership of assets-
factors that bear on the expected net benefit of bankruptcy for any 
petitioner-are not uniform across all debtors. Therefore, the prob-
ability that a petitioner would choose Chapter 13 is likely to be a 
function of demographic characteristics related to the general struc-
ture and composition of household assets and liabilities. 
High debt-use life cycle. Demand for household debt is related to 
the life cycle of the debtor. Consumers in the 25 to 44 years-of-age 
group are the most heavy users of consumer and mortgage credit. 
"Information on the purpose of and data regarding the number of CCCS offices were ob-
tained from the National foundation for Consumer Credit, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
The post-bankruptcy costs associated with the effect of a bankruptcy 
on future access to credit markets are hypothesized to be most signifi-
cant for persons having high immediate demands for credit. If these 
costs are significant in the debtor's choice after deciding to file for 
bankruptcy, the probability that a petitioner would choose Chapter 
13 would be high among these younger debtors, holding other things 
constant. 
Income. Unsecured debts represent claims against the future 
uncertain income of the debtor and have the lowest priority for 
repayment in either chapter of nonbusiness bankruptcy. Holding 
other things constant, the higher the value of unsecured debts owed 
by the petitioner, the higher the net benefit of bankruptcy. Due to the 
fact that a petitioner for Chapter 13 with disposable income may be 
required to repay a greater proportion of unsecured debts than would 
be the case if he or she had chosen Chapter 7, the probability that a 
petitioner will choose Chapter 13 is expected to decline as the amount 
of unsecured debts owed and income increase. The dollar amount of 
unsecured credit owed is an increasing function of household in-
come. In the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, the average dollar 
value of unsecured debts owed by credit-using households with an-
nual income in excess of $35,000 was $2,100. In contrast, households 
with annual incomes at or below $10,000 had an average dollar value 
of unsecured credit outstanding of $550. Therefore, holding other 
things constant, the probability that petitioners choose Chapter 13 
should decline with income. 
Home ownership. Another demographic characteristic expected to 
influence petitioners' choice is home ownership. Equity in the 
primary residence is one of the most significant assets for house-
holds. Logically, the dollar value of the exemption of equity in real 
property is one of the most significant of the asset exemptions 
allowances. Home owners with equity exceeding the allowed exemp-
tion would be expected to choose Chapter 13 to protect that asset. In 
Chapter 7, they might be forced to sell the home to release the equity 
to the uses of the unsecured creditors. The probability that peti-
tioners choose Chapter 13 should increase as the proportion of peti-
tioners owning homes increases. 11 
"According to data from Sullivan (l 982), about 28 percent of petitions filed under Chapter 7 
in 1981 were filed by homeowners. Sullivan and Drecnik (1984) found that 43 percent oi 
Chapter 13 petitions were home owners. 
Metropolitan area. Finally, the probability that a debtor would 
choose Chapter 13 is hypothesized to increase if the debtor lives in a 
metropolitan area versus a rural one. First, the quality of credit infor-
mation is expected to be greater (more complete files) for persons liv-
ing in metropolitan areas relative to those living in rural settings. 
Thus, filing Chapter 7 would have a greater negative effect on the 
credit reports of those debtors. Also, those living in metropolitan 
areas are likely to have access to a broader set of employment oppor-
tunities in the event of a layoff or reduction in work hours. Instead of 
straight bankruptcy, they could file under Chapter 13, thereby reduc-
ing their payment obligations to levels consistent with their income 
flows. 
In sum, the probability that petitioners for nonbusiness bank-
ruptcy would file under Chapter 13 is hypothesized to increase with 
restrictions on wage garnishment (amount of secured debts), with 
current and future demand for credit (being in the high debt-use cycle 
of life), with home ownership, and for populations living in metro-
politan areas. The probability of Chapter 13 filings is hypothesized to 
decline as the level of assets exempted in Chapter 7 increases, as the 
availability of consumer credit counseling incre'lses, and as the 
amount of unsecured credit owed by the debtor increases. 
Model Estimation 
In the previous section, factors that are expected to influence the 
net benefits for an individual petitioner filing under one chapter ver-
sus the other were discussed. Because detailed data on individual 
bankruptcy petitions were unavailable, we abstract from the individ-
ual problem to test the hypotheses presented above. For the random-
ly selected debtor, the probability of a positive net benefit from filing 
under Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7 is a function of the average 
values that the relevant variables take in the debtor's resident state. 
In estimating the factors that influence the probability of a Chapter 
13 petition (rather than a Chapter 7), the proportion of nonbusiness 
bankruptcies filed in a state under Chapter 13 is explained. In this 
section, measures of the variables included in the model are intro-
duced, and the hypotheses formulated above are tested. 
To analyze the determinants of this proportion, a two-limit probit, 
or "tobit" regression model is employed. Define Y as the probability 
that a debtor files a Chapter 13 petition-a continuous variable 
bounded between 0 and I. As presented by Rosett and Nelson (1975), 




0.0 when Y* - € ~ 0 
1.0 when Y* - € ~ 1.0 
Y* - f when 0 s Y* - € s 1.0 € - N(O,u) (1) 
where Y* is a linear function of the factors identified above. In addi-
tion, a measure identifying states where debtors are strongly en-
couraged to file under Chapter 13 is included in the analysis. The 
pooling of cross-state data across four years requires the inclusion of 
a measure of time in the equation. Thus, the following function is 
estimated. 
Y* = f3o + {3,Lowex + f32 Nogar + {31CCCS 
+ {34 High Debt Use + {3,Income + {30 Home + {31 Metro 
+ {3.Court + f3o Time + t. (2) 
The cross-state data used in the analysis are for the time period 
1983 to 1986." The dependent variable Y* is measured by the pro-
portion of nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 13 
during the bankruptcy year for each state, as reported by the 
Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
District Courts. 
The first two variables are straightforward proxies for the state 
legal conditions concerning asset exemption allowances in liquidation 
and garnishment restrictions. Because the personal exemption 
allowances are so varied across states and difficult to quantify in 
terms of absolute value, the level of a state's asset exemption 
allowance is measured by the amount of exempt interest in property 
owned by the debtor for a residence, that is, the "homestead exemp-
tion." "Lowex" is a Oil dummy variable that takes a value of one 
for states that have opted out of the Federal standard and have set a 
"The time period for the data was the 12 month period ending June 30 each year. These 
years were chosen because of the potential for measuring the impact of the 1984 Amendments 
and given data availability. Data sources and detailed definitions arc presented in the 
Appendix. 
homestead exemption below the $7,500 interest (per debtor) exempt 
under the Federal standard. Otherwise, the variable has a zero value. 
For 1983, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming were designated as low 
exemption states. Because Wyoming increased its homestead exemp-
tion in 1983, it is assigned a zero value for 1984 through 1986. The re-
mainder of the states did not change their statutes during the study 
period. 
All states operate under a Federal law restricting the extent to 
which debtors' wages are subject to garnishment. A 011 dummy 
variable "Nogar" takes the value of one for those states where gar-
nishment is 100 percent prohibited for the payment of consumer 
debts. Otherwise the variable takes a zero value." 
The effect of the availability of not-for-profit credit counseling on 
the probability of a Chapter 13 petition is captured in the model by 
the inclusion of a continuous variable "CCCS" that equals the 
number of CCCS offices in a state per 1,000 households. 
The demographic variables-"High Debt Use," "Income," 
"Home," and "Metro"-are measures for the population of each 
state. "High Debt Use" is a continuous variable representing the 
proportion of the population in each state that is in the 25 to 44 age 
category. "Income" is an index of the per capita income in a state 
relative to the average U.S. per capita income (Index = 1.0 for states 
with per capita income equal to the average for the U.S.). "Home" is 
a continuous variable equal to the proportion of households in each 
state that own their principal residences. "Metro" is the proportion 
of the population in each state living in a metropolitan area. 
Adjustments for known court practices 
There are established traditions in some court districts that debtors 
are strongly encouraged by their attorneys and referees in bankruptcy 
to file under Chapter 13. Thus, the percentage of nonbusiness peti-
_ "Other formulations of the garnishment variable were tested, including a dummy vari_a_ble 
:or states with garnishment restrictions more binding than the Federal law but not prohtbmng 
iarnishment altogether. The restriction variable was not significant. The allernative of for-
nulating the garnishment variable as a continuous one representing the percentage of income 
hat could be garnished was not tested in the analysis because the dummy variable provided 
ogical results consistent with those of previous bankruptcy studies. 
tions in a state filed under Chapter 13 may also be a function of 
unique practices in certain courts. Stanley and Girth (1971) stated 
that "in Northern Alabama, the use of Chapter 13 has been estab-
lished for more than thirty years as a means of getting low-income 
citizens to repay their debts." They also indicated that "Maine 
referees encourage debtors to file under Chapter 13. '' A judge from 
the Middle Tennessee court district indicated that he allowed lawyers 
to charge a higher fee for a Chapter 13 petition. 14 To the extent that 
such practices are known to exist, their effects are captured in rhe 
analysis by a dummy variable, "Court," taking the value of one for 
the above mentioned states where there is extraordinary pressure on 
debtors to file under Chapter 13 and 0 otherwise. 
Adjustments for time 
The 1984 Amendments contained provisions that had the potential 
to change debtors' incentives with regard to their choices between 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 significantly. First, the Federal personal 
asset exemption standard was reduced, making Chapter 7 less attrac-
tive in those states that had not opted out of the Federal standard. 
However, the amendments reduced the probability that a zero repay-
ment plan would be approved-a debtor now must have zero 
disposable income before such a plan would be approved. Previ-
ously, zero repayment plans were considered good faith efforts to 
repay debts if the debtor would have qualified under Chapter 7 as a 
"no asset" case. 
To capture the time trends in the data associated with changes in 
the code, a dummy variable is included for each year between 1984 
through 1986 in the pooled time series analysis. This procedure effec-
tively shifts the intercept of the estimated equation upward or 
downward for each year, relative to 1983, leaving the estimated coef-
ficients of the other explanatory variables unchanged. 
"Keith Lundin, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, in remarks prepared for presentation at the 
Personal Bankruptcy Conference sponsored by the Credit Research Center, Purdue Univer-
sity, November, 1987. 
TABLE I 
Pooled Analysis of Determinants of the Proportion of 















Number of Observations = 204 





























•Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level of confidence. 














The maximum likelihood parameter estimates of equation (2) are 
presented in Table l. '~ Asymptotic properties of the procedure are 
called on for t-tests of statistical significance. 
The overall fit of the model can be evaluated by the likelihood 
ratio statistic. We denote the maximum log-likelihood function con-
straining all parameters to equal to zero as L(O) and the uncon-
strained maximum log-likelihood function as L(B). For this esti-
mated model the null hypothesis that all coefficients are 0 is rejected 
at the 95 percent level of confidence. The coefficients of the variables 
representing the legal context of the debtors' choices between 
Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 satisfy a priori expectations and are signifi-
cant in explaining the variation in the proportion of Chapter 13 fil-
ings across the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The proba-
bility that debtors chose Chapter 13 is a significant function of the 
"The two-limit "tobit" procedure in LJMDEP uses the David-Fletcher-Powell iterative 
maximization method. Ordinary least squares estimation of equation (2) produces similar 
results. 
level of asset exemptions, as captured by the level of the homestead 
exemption relative to the level of the Federal exemption. Debtors in 
states with low asset exemptions are significantly more likely to file 
under Chapter 13 than debtors in states with more generous exemp-
tion allowances. Where debtors are more likely to qualify as "no 
asset" cases, the probability of filing under Chapter 13 declines. 
As expected, debtors filing for bankruptcy in states that prohibit 
garnishment of wages are significantly more likely to file under 
Chapter 13 than debtors in states that allow more aggressive garnish-
ment procedures. Given the relatively low cost of outright default in 
those states with garnishment prohibitions, lenders must adjust, 
perhaps by requiring more security on consumer debts. Chapter 13 
has a relatively high net benefit in comparison with Chapter 7 for 
debtors with more secured debts because of the "cram-down" provi-
sion in Chapter 13. In support of this finding, White (1987-1988) 
documented that secured debts made up 68 percent of debts listed on 
Chapter 13 petitions and 42 percent of debts on Chapter 7 petitions. 
The availability of not-for-profit credit counseling is significantly 
negatively associated with the probability that debtors chose Chapter 
13 over Chapter 7. In other words, credit counseling is a substitute 
for Chapter 13 for those debtors who have disposable income but 
who cannot manage their existing credit contracts. 
With one exception, the coefficients of the demographic variables 
had the expected signs and significance. The probability that peti-
tioners file under Chapter 13 is significantly higher where there is a 
higher proportion of persons in the high debt-use phase of the life cy-
cle. This result supports the hypothesis that post-bankruptcy costs 
play a significant role in debtors' choices in bankruptcy. Although 
young debtors might be more likely to qualify for Chapter 7 as "no 
asset" cases, they are less likely to file under Chapter 7. Given their 
high demand for future credit, the cost associated with having a 
negative rating on their credit reports is greater with Chapter 7 than 
with Chapter 13. The result is also consistent with the likelihood that 
young debtors are the most likely to have student debts. Since stu-
dent debts may be discharged under Chapter 13 but are not dis-
charged under Chapter 7, young debtors may have an added incen-
tive to file under Chapter 13. 
The coefficient of the income measure is significant and negative. 
In states with relatively high per capita income, the probability that 
debtors choose Chapter 13 is significantly lower. The sign and signifi-
TABLE 2 
The Proportion of Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Petitions 
Filed under Chapter 13 by Year and Asset Exemption Level* 
Asset 
Year 
Exemption Level 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Low .346 .367 .367 .363 .400 .380 
High .252 .268 .285 .274 .268 .239 
Overall .276 .296 .308 .298 .305 .278 
•Proportion calculated by dividing the number of petitions filed under Chapter 13 by the total 
of nonbusiness petitions filed in the year overall and for the low and high exemption states. 
cance of the income coefficient support the hypothesis that higher in-
come petitioners having greater dollar amount of unsecured credit 
benefit more under Chapter 7, holding other things constant.. 
The measure of home ownership has a significant negative associa-
tion with the probability that petitioners file under Chapter 13-a 
result inconsistent with the hypothesis that a homeowner's ability to 
protect home equity is greater in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7. 
Perhaps this result can be attributed to the fact that the asset exemp-
tion variable "Lowex" is based on the home equity exemption and, 
therefore, is already capturing the extent to which the incentive to 
protect home equity influences debtors' decisions in bankruptcy. 
The coefficient of the proportion of the state's population living in 
a metropolitan area is positive and significant. This finding supports 
the hypothesis that the credit information kept on debtors living in 
metropolitan areas may be more complete and of higher quality, 
making a straight bankruptcy more costly. 
A significant time trend in the proportion of petitions filed under 
Chapter 13 does not exist. A more detailed view of the trend in the 
proportion of nonbusiness petitions filed under Chapter 13 during 
the years before and after the 1984 legislation was passed is provided 
in Table 2. In 1983, the proportion of all nonbusiness bankruptcy 
petitions filed under Chapter 13 peaked. Following the enactment of 
the 1984 Amendments, this overall proportion declined. In states 
with high asset exemption allowances, there was a rather sharp and 
steady decline after 1983 in the probability that Chapter 13 was 
selected. In the low exemption states, the proportion of petitions 
filed under Chapter 13 continued to increase through 1985 before it 
declined in 1986. 
The proVIs1ons of the 1984 Amendments reduced petitioners' 
abilities to file repayment plans under Chapter 13 that provided zero 
repayment of unsecured debts. This alternative would have been 
most attractive to petitioners who could have filed under Chapter 7 
as "no asset" cases. It is logical that the elimination of that possibil-
ity would have the greatest impact in states with high asset exemption 
allowances. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bankruptcy Code provides that petitioners for nonbusiness 
bankruptcy may choose between rehabilitation and liquidation. The 
procedures established in the recent revisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code were crafted to encourage those who had disposable income to 
file under rehabilitation. An analysis of the factors related to the in-
terstate variation in the proportion of petitions filed under Chapter 
13 confirms that debtors in general make decisions that have a strong 
base in personal wealth-maximization. 
Debtors were more likely to file under Chapter 13 if they resided in 
states that enforced relatively low asset exemption allowances for Ii· 
quidation bankruptcy and/or if the state prohibited wage garnish-
ment for the repayment of consumer credit. The empirical results of 
the study supported hypotheses that the types of debt owed and the 
cost associated with the reduced availability of credit after bank· 
ruptcy also had significant influence on debtors' choices. Finally, the 
most recent changes to the law that decreased the debtors' flexibility 
under Chapter 13 had a negative effect on the probability that peti-
tioners would choose it, especially in states where a high value of 
assets is exempted from liquidation in Chapter 7. 
This analysis provides useful insights into the legal factors and 
credit market conditions that determine the economic incentives 
associated with personal bankruptcy. Further research into the soci· 
etal benefits and costs associated with allowing nonbusiness debtors 
to have choices in bankruptcy is suggested. 
APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Proportion Chapter 13: proportion of total nonbusiness petitions 
for bankruptcy filed in each state from July 1 through June 30 under 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Source: Bankruptcy Division, 
Administrative Office of the U.S. District Courts. 
Low Asset Exemption: 011 dummy variable taking the value of 1 
for those states that provided a homestead exemption in personal 
bankruptcy lower than that allowed under Federal law ($7,500 per 
debtor) and disallow the Federal asset exemption for residents of the 
state. These states were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. Wyoming in-
creased its homestead exemption level in 1983 and so was assigned a O 
value for 1984 on. Source: Collier on Bankruptcy, 15th Edition 7 
(1987), "Exemptions." 
No Garnishment: Oil dummy variable taking the value of I for 
those states that prohibit wage garnishment, that is, 100 percent of 
wages are excluded from being garnished for the payment of ·con-
sumer credit. For 1983 through 1985, these states were: Montana, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, and Texas. For the 1986 bankruptcy year, Florida was 
added. Source: Commerce Clearing House Consumer Credit Guide. 
Consumer Credit Counseling Service: number of Consumer Credit 
Counseling Service offices per 1,000 households in each state, as of 
each year end. Source: National Federation for Consumer Credit, 
Inc. 
High Debt-Use: proportion of a state's population between 25 and 
44 years of age, as of July 1 each year. Source: Current Population 
Reports, Series P-25, U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
Income: annual per capita personal income for each state divided 
by the per capita personal income for the U.S. Source: Survey of 
Current Business, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Home Ownership: proportion of households in each state that 
owned a home; home owners estimated from the number of owner-
occupied housing units in 1980 plus new privately-owned housing 
units started each year. Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and the 
National Association of Home Builders. 
Metropolitan: the proportion of the population in the state 
residing inside a Metropolitan Statistical Area, as of July 1 each year. 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Court: Oil dummy variable taking the value of 1 for three stats 
(Alabama, Tennessee, and Maine) where some courts in the state 
pressure debtors to file under Chapter 13. Source: Stanley and Girth 
(1971) and Proceedings of conference: "Economic Aspects of Per-
sonal Bankruptcy: Research Needs," Credit Research Center, Pur-
due University, 1987. 
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